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THINKING BEYOND DEMOCRACY FOR A FUTURE COSMOPOLITAN LEGAL ORDER

by

THOMAS DALTON BRIGGS

Under the Direction of S.M. Love, PhD

ABSTRACT
Recent decades have seen sustained theoretical interest in how a cosmopolitan legal order
could be created in a manner consistent with the liberal human rights ideals and democratic
principles it is supposed to realize. I argue that this “democratic cosmopolitan” account of the
genesis of cosmopolitan law faces at least two dilemmas. Both concern the role that “learning
processes” play in its explanation of how a genuine cosmopolitan legal order can emerge from a
global transformation in the meaning of sovereignty and citizenship. The first dilemma is the
theory’s reliance on underdeveloped sociological claims about the nature of democratic political
processes, while the second concerns its one-sided analysis of how global trade and interdependence
might produce a kind of “cosmopolitan learning.” In light of these issues, I propose that
cosmopolitan theorists think beyond democracy as an ideal that should strictly guide the creation of a
cosmopolitan legal order.
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1

REALIZING COSMOPOLITAN RIGHT

Recent history has renewed the great “cosmopolitan debate,” with some key historical events
giving ammunition to both sides. On one hand, beginning with the end of the Cold War and the fall
of the USSR, many saw an opportunity appear—an opportunity to build certain global institutions
that might bring international politics under the yoke of law—the likes of which had not been seen
since the end of the second World War, however brief that opportunity turned out to be. And yet
the United States’ response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks quickly cast a shadow over these nascent
cosmopolitan aspirations, calling into question the liberal internationalism that, to many, was
beginning to serve as a mere veil for the power politics of the Western, United States-led order.
A key element of this back-and-forth between cosmopolitanism and its critics concerns the
cosmopolitan legal project, that is, the question of how a universal, international system of law
founded upon human rights principles could be established in a way consistent with the democratic
principles of self-determination to which cosmopolitanism is also committed. It is this debate that
is the present concern of this thesis. The authors discussed herein, for the most part, offer a
particular account of this genesis of cosmopolitan law that I will call “democratic
cosmopolitanism.” And it is this general theory that I will critique. To do so effectively, I think,
requires that we start with the cosmopolitanism of Immanuel Kant, the 18th-century philosopher
whose work inaugurates the tradition from which contemporary cosmopolitans draw.
Two years after publishing Perpetual Peace (1795), Kant declares the "ultimate goal of the
whole right of nations"—perpetual peace itself—to be "indeed an unachievable idea."1 Despite
practical reason demanding both individuals and states to leave the state of nature and the condition
of war therein, the best we can aspire to is but a mere "continual approximation" of the political
principles of peace. To understand the democratic cosmopolitans' project we will examine two

1

Kant 1797: §61.
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questions they ask of Kant's cosmopolitanism. The first question concerns why Kant abandoned
the original project of establishing a genuine cosmopolitan legal order, i.e., a law based on principles
of peace and human rights capable of binding nation-states; the second, how his account fails and
what conceptual revisions are necessary for its present revival.

1.1

Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and its Failure

Kant's account of the origin of law is in some important ways a familiar one. The state of nature
(i.e. war) among pre-civil individuals is one they ought to leave, because the uncertainty and danger
therein make realizing right impossible. Leaving this condition requires a legal order founded on an
innate right to freedom all possess in virtue of their being human.2 It is not wrong to coerce others
into this legal order if they refuse to join because without it right is impossible—that is, any coercion
required to bring people out of a state of nature is not (necessarily) unjust because the state of
nature itself is a condition of injustice.3 The solution to war among states and the international
state of nature, we might think, would be an analogous creation of a world state that lifts individuals
and states out from under the global threat of war. Kant rejects this world state solution on practical
and theoretical grounds. Practically, "the size of such a state of nations would make protecting each
member impossible,"4 with tyranny inevitably arising from the bloated body of a global Leviathan.
Theoretically, however, there is another issue: despite how both the pre-civil and the international
states of nature threaten human right generally with the possibility of war, coercion is not a rightful
solution for the international problem. Unlike individuals in the pre-civil state of nature, states
"already have a rightful constitution internally" and have thus "outgrown" the efforts of others to
impose their own idea of right upon them.5 Even though practical reason still demands states leave
2

Kant 1797: 6:237.
See Kant 1797: 6:312 and 6:350
4
Kant 1797: 6:350.
5
See Kant 1795: 8:355 and Kant 1797: 6:344.
3
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their lawless condition, history, for Kant, makes clear their general refusal to do so. In light of this
fact Kant replaces the original positive vision of a coercive world republic with "the negative
surrogate of a league," wherein states voluntarily covenant to avoid war and establish peace through
mutual cooperation.6
Kant was thus sensitive to two common objections to legal cosmopolitanism: concerns for
the inability of institutions of such size and scope to be democratically legitimate,7 and the worry
that the project is merely one people's vision of right coercively imposed on others. It turns out,
though, that the democratic cosmopolitans' answer to the second question—why Kant's account
fails and what can be done to revive it—will also be the basis for their response to the above
objections. But we must see, first, why they find Kant's voluntary league inadequate, and second,
how they diagnose Kant's statist notion of popular sovereignty to be the source of his account's failures.
The foundation of the democratic cosmopolitan account of a genuine legal order of cosmopolitan
right will be its reimagining of this statist understanding of popular sovereignty.
The importance of the cosmopolitan juridical project should be emphasized, because the actual
realization and institutionalization of cosmopolitan right is not merely an optimistic addendum to
the general moral vision. Rather, it is perhaps cosmopolitanism's most pressing theoretical task, for
the general lack of law capable of binding states themselves remains a constant threat to human
right even when it is realized (merely provisionally, however) in individual states.8 The distinction
here can be thought along the lines of that between classical international law and constitutionally
bound domestic law. Classical international law for the most part merely governed the relations
between states, but only to the extent that both sovereign contracting parties allowed it to. In such a
system, as Habermas notes, war itself was conceptually incapable of itself being a crime, as the jus

6

Kant 1795: 8:357.
See Dahl 2010 and Rawls 1999. For a contrasting view on this issue, see Nili 2015.
8
See Habermas 2008 and 2010; Held 1997 and 2010; and Benhabib 2007, 2012, and 2014.
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ad bellum was an absolute right constitutive of a state’s sovereign legal status.9 Post-WW2
developments in international law appeared to overturn this paradigm, at least partially, as war itself
became criminalized and international politics began to see a meaningful process of legalization.10
Yet the foreign and domestic policy of the United States in its present War on Terror legal paradigm
is a stark reminder for the cosmopolitans that more is clearly needed to constrain international
power politics. Hence the inadequacy of the voluntary league and its mere "continual
approximation" of the true cosmopolitan task. Habermas captures the problem when he says that
"Kant must still solve the conceptual problem of how this order could be thought of from the
viewpoint of law."11 Because Kant is unable to rely on coercion as a mechanism for realizing and
enforcing cosmopolitan right, he must instead substitute each state's moral self-binding to the voluntary
league for the legal binding that lies outside his conceptual grasp.12 A voluntary league is thus
incapable of realizing cosmopolitan right because each state is only provisionally bound by its own
moral ideas; that the central question of how states themselves can be brought together under law is
answered with a facsimile of legal order is more than just a practical concern, but a problem with
Kant's idea of cosmopolitanism itself.13
Kant's inability to think (popular) sovereignty beyond the form it was beginning to take on
in his historical context—the form of the nation-state—is, according to the democratic
cosmopolitans, the source of his account's failure. It is, first, why the initial disanalogy between the
pre-civil and international states of nature proves an insurmountable obstacle to a straightforward
juridification of cosmopolitan right. And while he recognized that practical reason demands states
bind themselves to higher law, he nevertheless failed to imagine an international order outside the
9

Habermas 2006: 119.
See Habermas 1997 and Finnemore 2004.
11
Habermas 1997: 116.
12
Habermas 1997: 118.
13
Habermas 1997: 118.
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horizon of the nation-state, instead settling on the voluntary league as the highest order to which we
can aspire. Moreover, global-historical transformations that Kant couldn't have predicted cast
further doubt on the possibility of realizing popular sovereignty and human right in the form of the
nation-state. Three global forces unleashed in the process of industrialization and globalization are
responsible: capitalism's international markets and the unrestrained movement of capital it demands;
ecological crises accelerated and magnified by industrialization; and finally, transnational migrations
of immigrants and refugees made more frequent and intense by the previous two forces.14 These
forces challenge the ideal of state sovereignty by dissolving the very distinction between a state's
internal and external affairs—its domestic and foreign policy—constitutive of the meaning of
sovereignty. State sovereignty and the self-determination of a people were "internally linked," as
Habermas puts it,15 for what it meant for a people to determine themselves was not just internal
self-legislating, but also the defense and defining of the community against those outside it. The
distinction, then, is what makes it possible to conceive of "internal self-legislating" in the first place.16 Thus the
modern concepts of sovereignty and self-determination emerged already-wedded to notions of
territory and identity that gave meaning to these concepts by providing their determinate form and
content. The modern forces of globalization and global crises, however, defy territorial constraints
and thus render the internal/external and foreign/domestic distinctions untenable from the point of
view of self-determination within a state. I’ll return to this point in a moment. But first let’s
provisionally consider how: multinational corporations and the global market exist and operate
outside any constraints a single state could possibly muster; ecological crises are issues that by their
nature require collective, global solutions; and, finally, international migrations challenge the

14

While this “death of the state” thesis actually remains quite a disputed one today, for the purposes of this
paper I will not dispute the claims of the democratic cosmopolitans here. I believe there are depeer flaws in their
accounts, hence my uninterest in challenging them on this point.
15
Habermas 2010: 270.
16
See Walzer 2015.
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traditional meaning of citizenship as well as the practical and ethical justifications for borders in
liberal societies wherein the idea of human right serves as a foundational legal concept.17
As individual states become increasingly beholden to these forces, so too does popular
sovereignty become increasingly threatened so long as the state remains the form through which it
must be realized.18 In addition, the mode in which this sovereignty has historically been expressed—
in an aggressive outward projection of "hard power" (e.g. military force)—is itself being replaced by
"soft power," the use of such means as persuasion and the control of information as the diplomatic
modus operandi of Western states. This shift thus "robs the subjects Kant had counted on in his
association of free states of the very basis for their independence."19 The primary obstacle to
realizing Kant's vision of cosmopolitan law—statist sovereignty—ends up being that which also fails
to adequately realize the (popular) sovereignty that gave the statist form its normative force in Kant's
theory.20

1.2

New Ideas of Sovereignty and Citizenship in Cosmopolitan Democracy
So Kant's vision of a cosmopolitan legal order failed because he couldn't see beyond the

statist horizon of sovereignty that dominated his historical context. And it is also precisely within
this horizon where sovereignty has been undermined, as contemporary global forces thwart
traditional attempts at sovereign self-assertion. Hence the detrimental elements of the statist
conception—its particularist (territorial/geographic, ethnic, religious) constitutive elements—are, in
17
18

See Benhabib 2004 and 2007.
See Held 1997, 2005, and 2010; Brown 2010; Benhabib 2004 and 2007; and Habermas 1997, 2008, and

2010.
19

Habermas 1997: 123.
It is important to note now, though, that recognizing the inadequacy of state sovereignty does not commit
the democratic cosmopolitans to a wholesale denial of the state form’s moral or (temporary) practical significance.
Habermas (2008), for example, makes clear that states will almost certainly need to play a role (for historically
contingent reasons) at the outset of any foreseeable cosmopolitan juridical order, insofar as they contribute to its
democratic legitimation. But it is also important to recognize that the new role for states in these accounts
nevertheless fundamentally alters states’ central normative function, indeed presupposing the transformation of
sovereignty I discuss in the next section.
20
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the democratic cosmopolitan accounts, replaced with a liberal-procedural vision of generally
accepted principles and procedures for governance that form the new locus of a people's sovereign
will or self-determination. I find important at least two dimensions along which the theories
reimagine the concept: (a) topological revisions and (b) procedural-representative ones. The former
concern the topology of the statist sovereignty concept—the internal/external, domestic/foreign
distinctions constitutive of the concept—and thus directly pertain to how contemporary global
forces dissolve such distinctions. The latter revise the processes through which sovereign
representation is expressed, fitting it within sovereignty's reimagined "vertical" topology.
1.2.1

Topological Revisions

What does it mean to say that those ecological-economic-demographic forces undermine
statist sovereignty due to the concept's topology? As we saw, the internal/external distinction is
central to the meaning of statist sovereignty. This is why Finnemore calls foreign intervention a
"liminal concept" for the idea of sovereignty, as it "sets the outer limits of its meaning" and thus
provides its determinate content.21 The basic topology of statist sovereignty is this division between
the internal and external because it is through this distinction that the sense of "self-determination"
is formed—a people (the internal) expressing its will against those forces pressing in from without
(the external). The problem, then, is that ecological collapse, the dynamics of global capitalism, and
mass displacements of peoples dissolve this distinction.
The contemporary topological weaknesses of statist sovereignty can be thought of
practically and theoretically. The dissolution of the internal/external distinction manifests along
ecological, economic, and demographic fault-lines, although these are all ideal types and mutually
involved. Ecological crises, to start, can only be managed effectively by great or near-great powers,
and even so, no great power acting alone could avoid the crises spawned by the steady march of
21

See Finnemore 2003. By “determinate content” I mean here, e.g., what policies the international system
permits a state to pursue, i.e., the zone (of actions) of a state’s legitimate sovereign authority.
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climate change. Because all states are (to varying degrees) both responsible for and subject to
ecological crises, the political space these crises open transcends the internal/external, domestic/
foreign distinctions. Something similar can be said about the political-economic dynamics of global
capitalism. Multinational corporations are a good example of the concrete forces blurring these
distinctions, as they are both internal and external to the nations in which they operate, often
capable of exerting more influence over domestic and international policy than most states could. It
makes sense, then, that the economic crisis appears as a kind of phantasm, simultaneously reaching
into the most basic economic life of a state while also looming above and beyond it, external to it, a
new kind of "foreign threat." FDR's declaration of "war against this depression" in his 1933
inaugural address—22a declaration of war and marshaling of the state apparatus against a domestic
economic crisis—is an archetypal example of how the blurring between the internal and external
manifests in practical state policy.23
In response to this blurring of the distinction constitutive of statist sovereignty,
cosmopolitan democracy reimagines sovereignty with a vertical topology. This "vertical division" of
sovereignty takes the basic idea of federalism from the United States as a loose model for a future
cosmopolitan supranational government. Individuals would exist in a network of overlapping
institutions, the highest global level responsible for managing issues like those ecological, economic,
and demographic ones mentioned above, with global peacekeeping an essential additional function.
The basic federalist idea, moreover, seems at first to avoid looking like a world state by dispersing
governmental authority across different vertical "levels," be they local, provincial, regional, global.
"What I am proposing," writes Thomas Pogge, "is not the idea of a centralized world state... [r]ather,
the proposal is that governmental authority—or sovereignty—be widely dispersed in the vertical

22

See Franklin D. Roosevelt 1933.
Scheuerman (2004, p. 175) discusses how the distinction between a country’s foreign and domestic
economic policy has become blurred over this period of the internationalization of the liberal legal-economic model.
23
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dimension."24 Institutions representing large global regions (similar to the European Union) would,
first, be created where they didn't already exist and, moreover, their decisions "recognized, in
principle, as legitimate independent sources of law."25 With this disassociation of sovereignty from
fundamentally particularist forms, the new political space opened by global issues need not
necessarily undercut popular sovereignty; international organizations would exist possessing the
proper size, scope, and authority to deal with the ecological, economic, and demographic issues that
defy spatio-territorial constraints. While there are unsurprisingly a great number of differences in
the specific institutional arrangements the democratic cosmopolitan theorists imagine, nevertheless
there is a generic "three level" global system that encompasses the general project: (1) a highest-level
supranational organization that at the minimum maintains security between nations; (2) transnational
organizations coordinating ecological, economic, and demographic policy; and (3) the remnants of
those democratically legitimate states and/or nations at the "lowest" level (of the major three) that
conducts local policy consonant with that set out by the larger cosmopolitan institutions.26
For now I want to put aside myriad questions concerning the practical functioning of this
"verticalized sovereignty" concept and the cosmopolitan institutions that would embody it, questions
about, e.g., the managing of the peacekeeping force, the degree to which higher levels control the
lowers' policies, who arbitrates disputes between the levels, etc. Regardless of such questions, the
new verticalized sovereignty at least in theory avoids several problems caused by its old statist
topology. First, institutions capable of addressing issues that cut across current borders would
ensure the popular sovereignty of those peoples that could not fully grapple with said issues
themselves. No longer beholden to the often mercurial wills of other nations, the world's peoples
could now appeal to a genuine legal authority to coordinate response to acute ecological or economic

24

Pogge 2010: 120.
Held 1997: 247.
26
See Habermas 2008 (esp. pp. 451-3) and Held 2010.
25
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crises. And, perhaps most important, the problem of nations going to war with each other would
now become a legal one, as the prevention of war becomes a central institutional task of the highest
level of cosmopolitan government.
1.2.2

Representative Revisions

Yet eventually we must ask: how will popular sovereignty be expressed in its new vertical
form? That is, what account of sovereign representation do these accounts offer whereby the
transnational institutions come to be seen as legitimate sources of law? The second dimension of
the democratic cosmopolitan revisions—their account of representation—attempts to answer this
question.
We should note first that the problem of representation isn't uncomplicated within the
familiar statist form of sovereignty. Again, the aforementioned three ideal-type global issues present
problems practical and theoretical. Mass displacements of peoples are, in particular, a novel
challenge to the traditional liberal idea of citizenship.27 First, fundamental principles of Western
liberal law attribute sets of basic rights to all individuals merely in virtue of their being human, their
humanity. Such rights open up a new kind of political space—however limited—to non-citizens
living alongside or within a nationally organized community. Originally, Kant imagined that the
world public created by such co-habitation (which is yet another blurring of the internal/external
distinction) would naturally drive humanity toward the creation of a world republic.28 The
quintessential cosmopolitan right for Kant is unsurprisingly the "right to hospitality,"29 the right to
travel and engage in the socio-economic life of another state. But Kant didn't resolve the tension
between a state's obligation to hospitality and its right to control its domestic borders, i.e., its internal

27

Seyla Benhabib has provided perhaps the most impressive sustained discussion of this problem from the
democratic cosmopolitan theoretical perspective. See Benhabib 2004, 2007, and 2014.
28
See Kant 1795.
29
See Kant 1797.
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policy, a tension we see today between international human rights laws and treaties and increasingly
contentious national immigration policies. In all fairness, though, Kant couldn't have foreseen or
imagined anything like the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis: not the magnitude of people displaced, nor
the capabilities and contentious ethico-legal obligations of the advanced industrial states responding
to it, and certainly not the dynamics of the isolationist–cosmopolitan divisions we see today both
within and among states. Like the blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign
economic policy, boundaries between the legal and socio-economic meanings of citizenship and
non-citizenship shift in ways that throw politics into confusion. Cultural and legal schisms have
arisen around a host of related issues, like the basic rights refugees and economic migrants should
have; the number of migrants a state should tolerate/accommodate; and, ultimately, the question of
whether certain groups even "belong" at all in their (new? or temporary?) state.
"Transnational migrations," says Benhabib, thus "bring to the fore the constitutive dilemma
at the heart of liberal democracies: between sovereign self-determination claims on the one hand
and adherence to universal human rights principles on the other."30 National identity has
accordingly become a fault-line for deep political-philosophical fractures. Political conflict about
national identity and immigration are nothing new, of course, at least in American history.31 But the
intensity and scope of these conflicts have reached a fever pitch in recent years, not least because of
the increased visibility mass media has given to such demographic and cultural disruptions. Mass
human displacements affect every element of a national identity, whether religious, ethnic, cultural,
etc., turning what were once fundamental political credences into centers of political conflict. In
this new political space cosmopolitan theorists have called great attention to the contingency of the
"national essences" often underlying notions of national identity.32 "There is only a historically

30

Benhabib 2004: 2.
Eric Kaufmann’s Whiteshift (2018) details this history at length.
32
See Appiah 2018.
31
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contingent connection between the principles underpinning citizenship and the national
community," says Held, and hence the principles of citizenship warrant "re-articulation" and "reentrench[ment]."33 What the legitimate cosmopolitan government(s) must now represent are not
particular peoples—defined by their territory, ethnicity, religion, etc.—but humanity as such,
embodied in certain universally valid principles and procedures recognized as such by those
particular peoples the institutions represent. I do not mean that the institutions imagined by the
cosmopolitan theorists will not take such particularist identities seriously; indeed, the idea of
regional transnational institutions requires informed distinctions between regions and peoples that
take into account their histories, cultures, and material circumstances. But the important theoretical
move is that the particularist identifications will no longer be foundational to the concept of
citizenship or political authority generally. Unlike past conceptions of popular representation and its
state conduits, cosmopolitan governance does away with the contingent, “mythological” unities
constitutive of the territorially/ethnically/nationally bounded absolute right of states that conflicts
with cosmopolitanism's universalistic liberal principles.34
The statist topology of sovereignty (the internal/external distinction) required a
correspondingly exclusive idea of citizenship in order for self-determination (popular sovereignty) to
have determinate meaning; without an Other clearly distinguishable from a state's citizens, the
collective subject of self-determination is thrown into ambiguity. Cosmopolitanism's vertical
sovereignty, if it is to abandon the particularist foundations of the concept, must then be built on
correspondingly non-exclusive, i.e., universal, criteria for political membership. Because
cosmopolitanism demands not only "world citizens" but a world wherein all are citizens,35 the

33

Held 2010: 307.
See Held 2005, especially p. 167, for a particularly clear and forceful statement of this view.
35
Hannah Arendt (1973) popularized this notion of “the right to have rights” as the central moral-juridical
problem concerning stateless peoples. This right to have rights amounts to a right to citizenship, for as Arendt (and
many others) experienced, human rights remain unrealizable outside a kind of juridical context currently only found
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foundations of cosmopolitan citizenship must be "general rules and principles which can be
entrenched and drawn upon in diverse settings."36 The rules and principles are, of course, principles
of human rights and the cosmopolitan lex suprema, the permanent suspension of states’ jus ad bellum,
their right to go to war. Being a cosmopolitan citizen means existing in a legal order wherein all
humanity enjoys basic rights and participates in governance across a potentially wide array of
institutions and communities; the cosmopolitan citizen would, in this way, take on multiple
citizenships corresponding to those issues and communities affecting them.37
The alternative model of citizenship is self-defeating, so the cosmopolitan theorists say,
because the distinctions upon which it must rest have been and continue to be rendered obsolete.
Only a universal citizenship is capable of representing the peoples of a world wherein deteriorating
ecology, unpredictable technologies and economies, and mass human displacement have made
isolation a practical impossibility. Cosmopolitanism thus "constitutes the political basis and political
philosophy of living in a global age."38 Indeed, the world has become so interconnected and issues
so far-reaching, they argue, that cosmopolitan democracy is the only form of government capable of
realizing (liberal) democracy and popular sovereignty.39

1.3

“Learning Processes” as a Key Explanatory Mechanism in Cosmopolitan Theory

Now we arrive at a decisive point in the democratic cosmopolitan account. Having supplied (a) the
topological structure of its concept of sovereignty, as well as (b) the principles underlying a
cosmopolitan citizenship, it must now give an account of (c) how such an order—a genuine legal
within states. For an essay on Arendt’s notion of the “right to have rights,” see Benhabib’s “‘The right to have
rights’: Hannah Arendt on the contradictions of the nation-state,” in Benhabib 2004.
36
Held 2010: 306.
37
See Held 2005 and 2010; Habermas 2008; and Pogge 1992.
38
Held 2005: 167.
39
See, among others, Habermas 2006, 2008, and 2010; Held 1997, 2005, and 2010; and Benhabib 2004,
2007, and 2014.
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order—would be and become democratically legitimate, i.e, how the peoples within it would see it as
realizing their right to self-determination. For if the cosmopolitan juridical order failed in this last
regard, then the accounts I have discussed here would not have moved beyond Kant's original
problem of articulating a universal law that did not violate the plurality of existing polities and their
right to self-determination. This last question is, moreover, twofold: first is the question of what
self-determination is in theory for the cosmopolitan citizen; second, how the world’s peoples would
transition from their predominant statist understanding of citizenship toward the cosmopolitan one.
If the cosmopolitan theorists are correct in their diagnosing statist sovereignty and
citizenship as terminally ill-suited for the present global situation; and, importantly, if we recognize
this point; then where else can we turn to but cosmopolitanism’s universalistic principles to realize
our right to self-determination if no particularist foundations are up to the task? “The issue,” writes
Habermas, “is whether we must finally bid farewell to the very idea of constitutional democracy or
whether the normative core of the vanishing world of democratic nation-states can be recovered
within the post-national constellation.”40 Hence cosmopolitan citizens would, accordingly, “take
their orientations from universalistic standards” of human right and world peace, standards
institutionally embodied in and realized by a future cosmopolitan world organization.41 This
“constitutional patriotism”42 would thus replace those old particularist identities that merely
contingently underlie our ideas of sovereignty and citizenship. But “constitutional patriotism” could
not fully replace those ideas because, first, in doing so it would dissolve the pluralism that is both the
starting point of cosmopolitan theory as well as the condition a cosmopolitan legal order must
respect if it is to be democratically legitimate. Second, the general architecture of a cosmopolitan
legal order as proposed calls for regional and sub-regional institutions (including juridically
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subordinated nation-states) to supplement the overarching supranational one; and so a modified
form of national citizenship still remains in the cosmopolitan account, chiefly to make use of the
processes of democratic legitimation some existing states embody.43
The development of the cosmopolitan legal order encounters here yet another obstacle, the
product of the theory’s inability to fully banish a particularist form of citizenship (however
juridically subordinated) from its proposed legal architecture. The practical dimension of the
problem concerns how present world opinion is to move away from a particularist/statist idea of
sovereignty and citizenship toward a suitably cosmopolitan one. Crucially, brute coercion is not an
available option, as it wasn’t for Kant, due to the normative core of the theory as it has been
imagined.44 The cosmopolitan theorists are quite clear on this point.45 The creation of a
cosmopolitan legal order must occur consensually, and so some kind of permissibly (non-)coercive
mechanism for its realization must be identified. More will be said about this problem shortly. But
first I will introduce its theoretical counterpart, which Habermas calls a “major gap” in the
cosmopolitan legal account. His comments are worth quoting at length:
[This gap] primarily concerns the legitimate expectations and demands of citizens in their
contrasting roles as cosmopolitan and national citizens. Cosmopolitan citizens take their
orientation from universalistic standards which the peace and human rights policies of the
United Nations must satisfy no less than a global domestic politics negotiated among global
players. National citizens, by contrast, measure the conduct of their governments and chief
negotiators in these international arenas in the first instance not by global standards of justice
but above all by the effective observance of national or regional interests. But if this conflict
were fought out in the heads of the same citizens, the notions of legitimacy that evolved
within the cosmopolitan framework of the international community would inevitably clash
with the legitimate expectations and demands derived from the frame of reference of the
respective nation-states.46
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This problem of a “split consciousness” in the minds of future cosmopolitan citizens, we should
note, appears (to Habermas) even after ideas of a cosmopolitan sovereignty and citizenship have
“evolved” in the international community, and would thus also appear within this initial stage of
“evolution” as well. So this split consciousness problem is not wholly separable from the above
practical problem. The solution to both problems that the cosmopolitan theorists mobilize is built
upon a notion of cosmopolitan learning processes, an explanatory mechanism that acts as a theoretical
fulcrum for the rest of the cosmopolitan legal project. Now we must see how this notion appears in
the different accounts I’ve referenced so far.
Habermas directly appeals to “learning processes” to explain the “constitutionalization of
international law,” his term for the world transition to cosmopolitan law. “From the perspective of a
politically constituted world society,” he writes, “both governments and populations would have to
adopt new orientations and in this sense ‘learn.’”47 Although he recognizes that states today are far
from living up to the “historical learning processes” that emerged as the post-WWII order took
shape, nascent cosmopolitan institutions like the United Nations (UN) and the European Union
(EU) evidence the continuing possible development of this cosmopolitan Geist. We can think of the
different kinds of learning this transformation requires in terms of the two different subjects of
cosmopolitan law: states (governments) and individuals (peoples). States (and future regional
governments) will have to adapt their range of legitimate action to those policies in line with the
cosmopolitan commitments to peace and human rights. The structure of the EU, with its vertical
division of law- and policy-making, illustrates how states can take on new roles wherein they
become “fallible agent[s] of the world [European] community.”48 Under the threat of sanction from
the EU, individual European states have, to a significant extent, organized their domestic law around
cosmopolitan principles while nevertheless still retaining their monopoly on violence. We should
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note that the origins of this nascent European cosmopolitanism were far from “consensual” or
democratic, given the essential role the Second World War and the ensuing conflict between the first
two superpowers played in this story.
Nevertheless, these institutions have proved enduring, all things considered. But as recent
years especially have taught us, an additional learning process must take place if such cosmopolitan
transformations are to continue their development toward genuine cosmopolitan law. We have seen
how the particularist notions of citizenship and sovereignty can be mobilized against the
cosmopolitan project even when they oppose consensus among governmental elites, which is what
occurred in Britain’s dramatically prolonged exit from the EU. So peoples must also undergo
learning processes cultural, social, and political before a condition of cosmopolitan law can be said
to exist in an enduring way. Cosmopolitan theorists see these particularist (nationalist, religious,
ethnic) attitudes as “obstinate frame[s] of mind,”49 historically contingent relics of a normatively
obsolete international order. How a continued application of current nascent cosmopolitan
practices might lead to further development—rather than stagnation or reversal—remains unclear,
especially if states maintain their monopoly on legitimate force before their “obstinate” populations
“learn.” The cosmopolitan theorists adapt two ideas from Kant to explain how such a
transformation might take place.
The first idea concerns how cosmopolitan law might develop among those states wherein its
core principles have already “taken root.” According to Kant, free trade and laws of hospitality
guaranteeing the right to travel and interact with foreigners will create a broader community of
interests and a spirit of camaraderie among those involved.50 The thought is that, if different
peoples nevertheless all live in the same “global public,” then a common morality—i.e., a
cosmopolitan one—will develop among them. So long as the conditions such a global public
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requires are maintained over some period, then we can expect to see a gradual transformation in the
relations between these states and peoples toward cosmopolitan law. Jeremy Waldron offers a
similar idea in his account of the “cosmopolitan thicket” of interlocking laws, treaties, and norms
currently at work in international politics.51 Although this thicket is of course far from resembling a
genuine cosmopolitan legal order, its very existence goes to show that, with the correct nourishing
and care, further development along the cosmopolitan trajectory is possible. Free trade and the
opinions of a global public can thus act as a “healthy soil” in which other principles and laws can
eventually take root. Given the proper environment, the world’s peoples can thus come to learn a
cosmopolitan morality.
These conditions, however, are only those necessary for a cosmopolitan transformation to take
place where a nascent cosmopolitanism already exists. While we already see a version of this order in
Europe and North America, the question remains as to how non-citizens and other peoples will
come to be incorporated within it. Seyla Benhabib attempts to answer this crucial question with her
idea of “democratic iterations.” Benhabib takes the developments in European democracy over the
last three-quarters of a century to suggest that there is something inherent in democratic political
processes themselves that mediates between local moralities and cosmopolitan norms, “between
universal norms and the will of democratic majorities.”52 Taking up Kant’s idea that states with
certain republican constitutions have a natural affinity to cooperate, she claims that repeated
modifications of law through democratic processes produces a “jurisgenerative politics” that
gradually incorporates and encompasses non-citizens and outsiders. In the process, a cosmopolitan
idea of citizenship is supposed to emerge. Examples of such jurisgenerative politics, Benhabib
points out, can be found in how the EU and its member states have gradually increased the rights of
non-citizens and, moreover, have led efforts to extend such measures in the international arena
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generally.

1.4

Taking Stock

I’ll now summarize all the moving parts I’ve discussed so far. The democratic cosmopolitan
theorists have given us an account of how genuine cosmopolitan law could rightfully emerge from
our present situation. These accounts try to overcome the failures and obstacles that Kant’s account
faced by reimagining the concepts of sovereignty and citizenship. Kant could only offer a facsimile
legal cosmopolitanism because his statist understanding of these concepts prevented him from
imagining a realistic alternative to states as the highest existing legal authorities. The cosmopolitans
overcame this first obstacle by providing a universalistic model of sovereignty and citizenship, so
that in theory the plurality of peoples could be respected while united in a single cosmopolitan legal
order. But here they confront a new problem arising, first, from the fact that our present pluralist
condition is one in which the “historically obstinate” understandings of sovereignty and citizenship
still predominate; and second, from their inability to utilize coercion as a mechanism for creating a
cosmopolitan legal order, for bridging this gap between these current understandings and the
cosmopolitan ones awaiting their realization.
To bridge this gap the theorists all introduce “learning processes” as the mechanism that
explains how a non-coercive (i.e., consensual and democratically legitimate) cosmopolitan
transformation could occur in our present condition. The move from cosmopolitan theory to
cosmopolitan law, they say, can take place through some combination of the following. First, a
continued application of those existing nascent cosmopolitan laws and institutions can produce the
conditions required for peoples to “learn” cosmopolitan principles—nourishing a "cosmopolitan
thicket" of international norms and laws—and engender this learning among those involved
populations. The post-WWII liberal order built on free trade, commerce, and the resultant global
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public is the exemplary historical instance of such learning processes for the cosmopolitans. But for
a genuine cosmopolitan law to emerge there must also be an account of how this order would
expand to include non-citizens and other peoples. Here the learning processes are found in a
particular idea of democratic politics acting as a bridge between local moralities and universal
cosmopolitan principles. Through “democratic iterations” different peoples can be gradually united
in a cosmopolitan legal order, as such iterations present an opportunity for them to “learn”
cosmopolitan principles through their domestic enacting of them alongside others. Learning
processes, then, are the cosmopolitans’ answer to the paradoxes Kant confronted when he tried to
think how plurality might be respected when united under a universal law.

2

SOME DILEMMAS FOR LEGAL COSMOPOLITANISM

The democratic cosmopolitans believe those obstacles to establishing cosmopolitan law are only
“complex coordination problems” which do not present a “real dilemma” for the future of legal
cosmopolitanism.53 I disagree. Though the obstacles may very well be kinds of coordination
problems, they are certainly not only that. The problem Rousseau brings to our attention in his story
of the stag hunt, for example, isn’t merely that of coordinating the hunting party—rather, it is the
structural problem of how we can even imagine cooperation among self-interested individuals in the absence of a force
to correct any errant, self-interested behavior.54 But we must remember that cosmopolitans have foreclosed
the coordinating force available to Rousseau as a potential solution to this problem: the creation of a
sovereign. Indeed, the entire exercise in developing accounts of “learning processes” is not an
attempt to solve the analogous “coordination problem” among self-interested states in the
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international arena, but instead an attempt to dissolve the assumptions underlying it; namely, the
assumptions of statist sovereignty and particularist citizenships that constituted the cosmopolitan
dilemma as Kant confronted it. In this way learning processes are the mechanism through which
the international community is to be transformed in a way that bypasses the traditional
understanding of international anarchy.55

2.1

The Peculiar Nature of Cosmopolitan “Learning Processes”

I think there are a couple problems with how the cosmopolitans use learning processes to explain
the genesis of cosmopolitan law. It’s important, though, to point out that “learning” can be quite an
ambiguous concept. All learning is a kind of process, but we have to specify the kind of learning
we’re talking about here. Learning the rules to a board game is different than learning how to live a
certain kind of way with others. Several people from quite different cultures (I think it’s safe to
assume) could probably figure out the rules to a board game they’re all trying to play, so long as
there isn’t a significant language barrier. They share a practical goal (we assume each is intent on
playing the board game, or is compelled to) and they have the means to carry it out, namely their
sociability and their cognition. So long as nothing actively interferes with the process, it seems
reasonable to say that the group will play the game by undergoing a collective “learning process.”
The sociological and conceptual structures this requires are all accounted for, and so appealing to
learning processes to explain how they will eventually come to play the game together seems cogent.
Is this, then, the sense in which the cosmopolitans use “learning processes” in their theories?
There are important similarities. They provide a compelling case for why the predominant meanings
of sovereignty and citizenship have been rendered inadequate in today’s world. At the very least the
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concepts need revising, and it’s plausible that the cosmopolitans are right to claim that any
particularist foundations for these concepts will prove to be fatal flaws. Moreover, the global issues
responsible for this shift are, in a way, “universal” problems confronting all the world’s peoples,
much like how every player must confront the same challenges in a board game. So if the world is
to “play” this “game” without sacrificing in toto a liberal-democratic understanding of popular
sovereignty and citizenship,56 then it must “learn” the new cosmopolitan rules to the game, i.e., the
cosmopolitan ideas of sovereignty and citizenship. At least this is what the cosmopolitans seem to
say.
If someone is playing a game wrong, we are likely to correct them; and because they
presumably want to play it correctly, they will likely just thank us for pointing out their error. Or
perhaps they firmly believe they understood the rules correctly, and so the rulebook or some online
forums might have to be consulted. At worst someone intentionally plays incorrectly (cheats) and
we have to find someone else to play with. The first major problem with the cosmopolitans’ idea of
learning processes is that they don’t function like the ones in this hypothetical game. First, there is a
necessary indeterminacy in the “rules” that peoples must learn—i.e., how to live together in the
context of certain global issues—because we can only imagine such learning as democratic if what is
learned is the result of consensual interaction and cooperation, as it is in Benhabib’s idea of
“democratic iterations.” If we can specify the exact rules that need to be learned beforehand—
before we come together to play the game—then deliberation and compromise with peoples in a
“historically obstinate frame of mind” can only lead to an undemocratic paternalism, on the one
hand, or a distortion and erring from the cosmopolitan principles around which the world must be
organized, on the other. Even if we assume that such peoples would learn in the minimum sense of
coming to see that some kind of institutionalization of cosmopolitan principles must occur, the other
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kind of “learning”—figuring out what such arrangements would look like in particular
circumstances—must still take place. And we ought not assume that agreement would appear here,
as different peoples with their own interests would almost certainly have different (and thus
potentially incompatible) ideas about what sorts of cosmopolitan institutional arrangements they
would be willing to tolerate. The subject matter of this learning-how to live with one another lacks the
kind of objectivity found in, say, the rules to a board game, an objectivity that enables “learning
processes” to function as a real explanatory mechanism there.
The cosmopolitans recognize, to a degree, the need for this kind of objectivity when they
emphasize that realizing the new cosmopolitan paradigm depends on its core principles of
democracy and human rights being “available” and “clear” for all to see.57 Putting aside the myriad
meta-ethical questions this raises—like, for example, whether such principles can even be
“objective” in this way, what that would even mean, etc.—such comments nevertheless still evince
an essential ambiguity in the cosmopolitan account. On the one hand, cosmopolitan principles and
the cosmopolitan legal project purportedly enjoy a kind of “objective ethical necessity” that could
come to be consensually “seen” or “learned” by the world’s peoples if the structures such learning
requires—e.g., a global public, rights of hospitality, open commerce and free trade, interconnected
democratic political processes, etc.—are cultivated and maintained. But on the other hand, what
exactly is to be learned is left ambiguous in order to preserve the possibility that such learning will
proceed consensually, for the meaning of "consensual" and what it will look like will inevitably vary
from people to people.
I’m not saying that this kind of learning is impossible, or that we have no reason to expect it
ever to happen. In some way and for some indeterminate time it did in fact happen, as the
cosmopolitans point out, among the states that founded, entrenched, and expanded the post-WWII
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liberal order across the last half-century. The problem, though, is that in order for this learning to
serve as a foundation for a genuine legal order, there must be some corrective force that operates
when someone playing the game “forgets” what they’ve learned, or still continues (for whatever
reason) to play improperly. Cosmopolitanism, however, cannot appeal to the traditional corrective
force—a sovereign—because the genesis of this force—the force of genuine cosmopolitan law—is
what “learning processes” are supposed to explain! Instead, the cosmopolitans must find a corrective force
lurking within the very democratic learning processes themselves, but so far they’ve only offered an
underdeveloped sociology58 to support such a claim. Kant appealed to a natural teleology operating
in republican states to explain why, over time, we can expect the cosmopolitan spirit to develop
among them. An even stranger natural teleology, though, is required to explain how this
development would come to incorporate those states and peoples outside these orders, not to
mention why those outside would enter willingly.
The past couple decades have cast more doubt on cosmopolitan learning processes taking
place in the way cosmopolitans think they will. Indeed, faced with precisely the kind of questions
for which Benhabib develops her idea of “democratic iterations”—questions concerning the
meaning of citizenship, of incorporating those outside a polity within it, etc.—Great Britain and the
United States, as just two examples, have chosen to turn their backs on the kind of cosmopolitan
principles and institutions they purportedly learned over the past half-century. “There is no
guarantee that ‘learning’ is irreversible,” writes Raymond Geuss, pithily capturing the central issue;
“nor can any distinct sense be attributed to the claim that learning in the long term is natural, that is,
will take place unless prevented.”59 What’s needed to prevent such a backslide, I repeat, is a coercive
force—a kind of law—that lies out of reach precisely when the idea of a learning process must be
invoked in the cosmopolitan accounts. Paraphrasing Kenneth Waltz, if the end we seek is a
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cosmopolitan legal order, and if the basis for such an order is a network of “learning processes”
emanating from a certain kind of democratic politics, “then some active agency must be substituted
for the spontaneously functioning evolutionary forces whenever those forces seem to bog down.”60
The cosmopolitans don’t give us compelling reasons to think that peoples, when confronted with
global issues like mass migrations, ecological collapse, and economic crises will choose to enact or
continue to practice cosmopolitan politics, a politics that is often held responsible, rightly or
wrongly, for these issues even appearing in the first place.
2.1.1

A comment on consent, coercion, and cosmopolitan learning

Until now I’ve left open a crucial ambiguity: what counts as illegitimate coercion in these
cosmopolitan learning processes? That is, what exactly are the boundaries between consent and
coercion, so that we can distinguish between a cosmopolitan “slightly visible hand” that justifiably
pushes the learning processes along and one that pushes too hard? This question is an important
one because the answer to it will determine what, if any, “corrective forces” might in fact be
available to the cosmopolitans, so that they might fill the central explanatory gap in their notion of
learning processes I pointed out above. The traditional corrective force—the coercive, violent force
of law—is from the outset out of bounds. What would most closely approach this corrective force
in today’s international politics—the armed intervention—is also quite clearly out of bounds, as not
respecting the consent constraints on the establishment of cosmopolitan law.61 The force of arms is
not a legitimate way to correct errant learning processes, at least according to the cosmopolitan
accounts as they now stand. This much should be clear. The threat of sanctions as found in the
European Union appear to be legitimate, but we must remember that the EU, although imperfect(ly
cosmopolitan), is nevertheless an already existing supranational organization. So the sanctions it
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metes out have, in a way, already been deemed legitimate by the member states to whom such
sanctions might apply. But again, we are not just asking about coercion within an existing
cosmopolitan organization; we are trying to discover what this might look like in a legitimate process
of its creation. How are the learning processes leading to the cosmopolitan transformation to be
legitimately “corrected” when they go awry?
The different parts of the cosmopolitan account come together here to render this boundary
essentially ambiguous, or so I will now argue. To see why we must return to the beginning, but just
for a moment. Recall how, for Kant, the cosmopolitan dilemma arose from the disanalogous precivil and international states of nature, the two different conditions of war. In the pre-civil case,
coercing others into a legal order is justifiable because without this kind of order a condition of
right is impossible. But when it comes to other states and peoples, the external, international state
of war, such coercion becomes unjustifiable because some condition of right already exists internally,
within different states. And it was precisely this internal/external, i.e. statist, distinction which
prevented Kant from transcending the plurality of states and giving an account of the genesis of
cosmopolitan law. So long as we remain within the statist horizon, then, the boundaries between
coercion and consent in this context are relatively stable. Coercion amounts to violating another
state’s sovereignty—e.g. deploying armed force against their territory—whereas consensual interstate policy amounts to making use of the limited socio-economic agreements of a hypothetical
voluntary league to change another’s behavior. Because states have the prerogative to enter and exit
from such voluntary agreements—as well as the voluntary league itself—then any state or group of
states also has the prerogative to make such agreements conditional on others behaving in a certain
way.
Here we see another consequence of the dissolution of the internal/external distinction,
now in the blurring of the boundaries between consensual and coercive foreign policies. The
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cosmopolitans suspended the original dilemma Kant confronted by transcending the statist
distinctions constitutive of it. But by doing so, I argue that it has become practically impossible to
find a meaningful distinction between consensual and coercive “learning.” Sure, some actions
obviously fall on one side or the other. Sending an army to forcibly change another state’s laws and
attitudes to comport with cosmopolitan principles is quite clearly illegitimate coercion. And asking
said state in a global forum, mobilizing the social forces present there, is obviously permissible.
(And thus also consensual, if such appeals “correct” any errant “learning.” In the next section I
discuss whether such appeals and this global forum might be the kind of corrective force the
cosmopolitan account of learning processes needs.)
But what about economic sanctions? Remember that, according to the cosmopolitans, the
dynamics of global capitalism have overturned the ease with which Kant could see trade agreements
between states as uncontroversially “voluntary” ones. We need only glance at the controversies
arising from implementations of the “Washington Consensus” to see but one prominent historical
example of this transformation. Habermas notes, though, how smaller states are much more likely
to “learn,” i.e. “reorient” themselves to cosmopolitan principles, because they are much more
beholden to the global economic forces than are larger states.62 But in this instance, “learning
processes” only become more concrete explanatory mechanisms in virtue of the distinction between
consensual and coercive learning becoming less so. As I briefly mentioned above, we can see a corresponding
shift in the nature of economic policy generally over the last hundred years that bears out this point.
Two related trends are worth considering. The first is the increasing indistinction between domestic
and foreign economic policy, an indistinction that has resulted in policy measures once reserved for
external (and thus wartime) threats “collapsing inward” on domestic legal orders.63 From the point
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of view of the state, however, these changes appear rather necessary; in an increasingly globalized
economy, the economic crisis and the military crisis take on a similar appearance. If armed
intervention to correct errant learning isn’t allowed (excepting extreme cases), then why should
economic sanctions representing similar kinds of damage, instability, and suffering be viewed
differently? Sure the scope of the damage may vary, but mass unemployment, civil unrest, etc.,
present similar threats to the safety and welfare of a nation as might armed intervention. Moreover,
armed conflict and economic instability often accompany one another, a fact which casts even more
doubt on drawing a meaningful normative distinction between these two policies.
The cosmopolitan theorists, at the very least, need to articulate better what they mean to
capture when they distinguish between consensual learning and illegitimate coercion. As of now it’s
not at all clear what can ground such a distinction from the point of view of democratic
cosmopolitanism and its core normative commitments. Clarifying what policies are permitted by the
theory will be necessary if they are to supplement their central explanatory mechanism (learning
processes) with the corrective forces it requires to function as such; that is, if they are to explain
how peoples and their governments are to overcome their current understandings of sovereignty
and citizenship and adopt cosmopolitan principles. Now we will examine whether the cosmopolitan
account of those first kind of learning processes—the learning that can be cultivated among
already-existing-yet-nascent cosmopolitan governments and peoples—is on as firm a footing as it
needs to be.

2.2

A Healthy “Cosmopolitan Thicket” in Unhealthy Soil?

The basis for the first kind of learning that might take place—the cultivation of the “cosmopolitan
thicket” through international commerce and the regulative opinions of a global public—is, I argue,
not as firm as it needs to be. The idea that increased interdependence will somehow naturally
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produce cooperation, or better yet, result in those involved learning new political ideals, must
confront the fact that as interdependence increases, so too does the potential for conflict.
Cooperation presupposes the potential for conflict, as Robert Keohane tells us, because what need
would there be for the world's peoples to cooperate if they could pursue their interests in natural
harmony?64 To be sure, this relationship between interdependence, cooperation, and conflict is no
iron law; it no more posits an inevitable increase in conflict than it does cooperation. But it does give
us reason to question the role that interdependence and the learning it purportedly engenders play in
the above accounts of the genesis of a cosmopolitan legal order.
I see three prima facie plausible directions in which this cosmopolitan "slightly visible hand"
could push. Kant and the cosmopolitan theorists see forces at work leading toward a cosmopolitan
legal order. Those skeptical of cosmopolitan politics see a much gloomier destination, namely, a
world organization posing as cosmopolitan but which, in reality, merely serves the interests of the
powerful by providing a moral veneer to their imperial policies.65 The outcome discussed less often,
because less dramatic, is a middlingly (proto-)cosmopolitan world like the one we find ourselves in
now, beset by both statist and cosmopolitan politics. The latter will occasionally live up to these
principles but, more often, fails to do so on account of weak institutions and, as always, those
historically obstinate frames of mind among the peoples and states involved.
It's rather uncertain which outcome we'll see. But even if we don’t speculate, we can still
assess whether some hypothetical conditions—such as free commerce and a global public sphere—
would act as more or less "healthy soil" in which to cultivate our thicket of cosmopolitan law. Free
commerce, we should notice, take on two contradictory roles in this story. While internationally it is
supposed to create a community of common interests, domestically it acts as one of those novel
global forces undermining popular sovereignty. Perhaps “free trade” functions in an ideal sense in
64
65

See Keohane 2005.
See Schmitt (2006) and (2007); and Rasch (1999-2000).

35

the cosmopolitan account; that is, not as the unbridled dynamics of an unregulated global capitalism,
but of a new kind of economic system altogether. If this is the case, then the cosmopolitans must
provide an account of how the current economic system will be reformed so it can play this part in
the cosmopolitan transformation.
Finally, what reason do we have to believe that the opinions of a “global public” would serve
as a corrective force, regulating the policies of states and attitudes of peoples toward a
“cosmopolitan orientation”?66 In one sense, this idea is intuitively correct: the larger or more diverse
one’s community of discussion, then the chances of being exposed to points of view that can take
one out of their narrow or particularist frame of mind seem larger as well. But conditions of
discussion domestically remain far from ideal, and it’s hard to see how widening the sphere of
discussion would do anything to improve the current state of affairs. Raymond Geuss offers an
amusing retort to those who find in discussion a specific moral force at work:
Discussions, even discussions that take place under reasonably favorable conditions, are not
necessary enlightening, clarifying, or conducive to fostering consensus. In fact, they just as
often foster polemics, and generate further bitterness, rancor and division. Just think of
Brexit. I get along with most people better the less I know about what they really think and
feel. Anyone who has had any experience of discussions in the real world knows that they
can get nowhere and peter out, they can cause people to become even more confused than
they were at the outset and that they can lead to the hardening of opinion and the formation
of increasingly rigid and impenetrable fronts between different parties. The longer and
more intense the discussion, the worse it can get. This is precisely what motivated
Habermas in the theory of communicative action to appeal to the topos of an “ideal speech
situation” as a means for removing these difficulties. However, it is not at all obvious that
anyone who performs a speech act necessarily thereby “presupposes” that his current
situation is to be evaluated vis-à-vis what would be decided in an ideal speech situation, nor
that in such an ideal situation a consensus would necessarily be reached.67
Perhaps we should return to Thucydides to be reminded of the essentially unpredictable courses
that democratic processes of discussion can take.68 While a wider, global audience may induce a
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spirit of cosmopolitanism among some, it could just as easily spark ressentiment and a reaction against
cosmopolitanism among the interlocutors instead.

3

THINKING BEYOND DEMOCRACY

Whether statist or cosmopolitan, the idea of (popular) sovereignty appears unclear at best under the
shadow of those novel global crises. The democratic cosmopolitans, I think, have presented a
compelling critique of statist sovereignty while unfortunately encountering a kind of conceptual
impasse when trying to think beyond the concept. In these final sentences I’ll first offer some
thoughts on the nature of this impasse, and end with what many might consider to be a radical
suggestion—that we might have to think “beyond democracy” for establishing a cosmopolitan legal
order—but one which we nevertheless ought consider.
To state it shortly, the problem the democratic cosmopolitan account runs into is the
following: it tries to rework a central political concept—democracy—for conditions radically
different than those in which our understanding of the concept took shape. Modern constitutional
democracies emerged wholly wedded to notions of discrete, particular peoples and territories that
provided the form and substance for the new liberal-democratic political horizon, regardless of how
universalistic the rhetoric of democracy appeared to be. (Much of this rhetoric can be attributed to
the revolutionary force it provided to nascent democratic movements, movements which were very
particularist despite the appearance of their rhetoric.) When democratic cosmopolitanism attempts
to rethink the concept of constitutional democracy unbounded from particularist anchors, it is
forced to substitute a supposedly neutral educational process for the normatively untenable
particulars that once provided substance to the democracy concept. The problem, however, is that
the apparently democratic or neutral nature of such learning processes is in direct tension with the
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universal, substantive telos or product such processes are supposed to produce: namely, a political
community capable and willing to arrive at a particular consensus about certain core political
principles (of human rights, democracy, peace, etc.)
The problems democratic cosmopolitanism must internally resolve do not weaken its
critique of the particularist idea of popular sovereignty, though. Keeping a fraught concept because
an alternative remains unproven would not be wise. Hence I propose cosmopolitans move forward
with their critique and minimize the weaknesses of their account: that is, I think they ought to
concede the democratic deficit of their account and merely assert, in spite of it, the necessity of
transnational governance. The goal should be to establish international institutions capable of
dealing with and regulating those global issues of climate change, unregulated capitalism, and mass
human displacements, and then, once established, worry about how such institutions can be made
democratically accountable; not to mention figuring out what “democratic accountability” can even
look like or mean on a global scale. But for all the time spent worrying about how cosmopolitan law
can be created in a democratic way, those global issues—the ultimate threats to popular sovereignty—
march on, unrelenting. The ideal of popular sovereignty then might paradoxically require us to
think beyond the ideal of democracy, at least for the time being.

38

REFERENCES
Works by Kant
Kant. (1999) Practical Philosophy: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Trans. and ed. by
Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———(1795) Toward perpetual peace. In Kant (1999), pp. 311-52.
———(1797) The metaphysics of morals. In Kant (1999), pp. 353-604.

Agamben, Giorgio. (2005) State of Exception. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Appiah, Anthony. (2018) The Lies that Bind: Rethinking Identity. New York: Liveright Publishing
Corporation.
Arendt, Hannah. (1973) The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt.
Benhabib, Seyla. (2004) The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
———(2006) “Democratic Iterations: The Local, the National, and the Global.” Another
Cosmopolitanism, ed. Robert Post. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———(2007) “Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking
Citizenship in Volatile Times.” Citizenship Studies, 11:1, pp. 19-36.
———(2012) “Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Kant: Sovereignty and International Law.” Political Theory,
40:6, pp. 688-713.
———(2014) “Defending a cosmopolitanism without illusions: a reply to my critics.” Critical Review
of International Social and Political Philosophy, 17:6, pp. 697-715.
Brown, Garrett Wallace. (2010a) “Kant’s Cosmopolitanism.” The Cosmopolitan Reader, eds. Garrett
Wallace Brown and David Held. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 45-60.

39

———(2010b) “Moving from Cosmopolitan Legal Theory to Legal Practice: Models of
Cosmopolitan Law.” The Cosmopolitan Reader, eds. Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held.
Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 248-66.
Dahl, Robert. (2010) “Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View.” The
Cosmopolitan Reader, eds. Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.
423-434.
Finnemore, Martha. (2004) The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Geuss, Raymond. (2008) Philosophy and Real Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
———(2019) “A Republic of Discussion: Habermas at ninety.” The Point. https://
thepointmag.com/politics/a-republic-of-discussion-habermas-at-ninety/
Habermas, Jürgen. (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge: Polity Press.
———(1997) “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years’
Hindsight.” Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal. Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp.
113-53.
———(2006) The Divided West. Cambridge: Polity Press.
———(2008) “The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimacy Problems of a
Constitution for a World Society.” Constellations 15, no. 4: 444-55.
———(2010) “A Political Constitution for the Pluralist World Society.” The Cosmopolitan Reader, eds.
Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 267–288.
Held, David. (1997) “Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: A New Agenda.” Perpetual
Peace: Essay’s on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal.
———(2005) “Principles of Cosmopolitan Order.” Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez, pp. 153-169.
———(2010) “Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or Reform!” The Cosmopolitan

40

Reader, eds. Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 293-311.
Kaufmann, Eric. (2018) Whiteshift. New York: Abrams Press.
Keohane, Robert. (2005) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Milner, Helen. (1991) “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique.”
Review of International Studies 17/1: 67–85.
Nili, Shmuell. (2015) “Who’s afraid of a world state? A global sovereign and the statist-cosmopolitan
debate.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 18:3, pp. 241-263.
Orwin, Clifford. (1984) “Democracy and Distrust: A Lesson from Thucydides.” The American Scholar,
Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 313-325.
Pogge, Thomas. (1992) “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty.” Ethics, Vol. 103:1, pp. 48-75.
Rasch, William. (1999-2000) "A Just War or Just a War?: Schmitt, Habermas, and the Cosmopolitan
Orthodoxy." Cardazo Law Review 21: 1665-84.
Rawls, John. (1999) The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (1933) “First Inaugural Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt,” in The Avalon
Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy. Yale Law School. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
20th_century/froos1.asp
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (2011) The Basic Political Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
Inc.
Scheuerman, William E. (2000) “The Economic State of Emergency.” Cardazo Law Review 21:
1869-1894.
———(2004) Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Schmitt, Carl. (2006) The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum.

41

New York: Telos Press Publishing.
———(2007) The Concept of the Political. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Waldron, Jeremy. (2006) “Cosmopolitan Norms.” Another Cosmopolitanism, ed. Robert Post. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
———(2010) “What is Cosmopolitan?” The Cosmopolitan Reader, eds. Garrett Wallace Brown and
David Held. Polity, pp. 163-175.
Waltz, Kenneth. (2001) Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press.
Walzer, Michael. (2015) Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books.
Wendt, Alexander. (1992) “Anarchy is what States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power
Politics.” International Organizations 46/2: 391-425.

42

